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THE NEW THREAT TO FINANCIAL
REFORM: THE END-USER EXCEPTION TO
DODD-FRANK MANDATORY SWAP
CLEARANCE
JEREMY A. LIABO*
I.

INTRODUCTION

What does it mean to say that the corporate executive has a "social
responsibility" in his capacity as businessman? If this statement is
not pure rhetoric, it must mean that he is to act in some way that is
not in the interest of his employers.'
Milton Friedman
A.

The Law Has Been Signed but the Battle Continues

"It's done," and with that President Barack Obama signed the
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
(Dodd-Frank) into law. 2 The signing ceremony, which occurred in
front of a crowd of more than four hundred supporters, was a
public end to an over yearlong legislative battle.3 However, the
ceremony was by no means the end of financial reform. 4 Instead,
* Jeremy A. Liabo is a January 2012 graduate of The John Marshall Law
School. This article is dedicated to the loving memory of Jeremy's
grandfather, Leslie C. Liabo, whose life continues to serve as an inspiration to
this day.
1. Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its
Profits, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Sept. 13, 1970, at SM17, available at

http://select.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=F1OF11FB3E5810718EDDAA
0994D1405B808BFlD3&scp=1&sq=The+Social+Responsibility+of+Business+i
s+to+Increase+its+Profits&st=p#. Friedman goes on to state:
For example, that he is to refrain from increasing the price of the
product in order to contribute to the social objective of preventing
inflation, even though a price increase would be in the best interests of
the corporation. Or that he is to make expenditures on reducing
pollution beyond the amount that is in the best interests of the corporation or that is required by law in order to contribute to the social
objective of improving the environment.
Id.
2. Brady Dennis, Obama Ushers in New FinancialEra; Landmark Law is
Signed President Says Work Still Lies Ahead for Regulators,WASH. POST, July

22, 2010, at A13.
3. See id. (stating that "[t]he landmark legislation ... came after more
than a year of legislative wrangling and intense lobbying ....
4. Id.
117
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the spotlight has shifted to regulatory agencies where they have
begun the post-enactment process of creating the rules and
regulations necessary to give effect to Dodd-Frank.5 As a result of
Dodd-Frank, regulatory agencies must propose and finalize more
than two hundred rules and regulations. 6 The impact of the rules
and regulations creation process will have an impact on numerous
industries, as is evidenced by diverse groups that have contacted
the regulatory agencies in an attempt to voice their opinions on
the rule-making process.7
This Comment will focus on the regulatory decisions that
must be made to effectuate the end-user exception to mandatory
swap clearance. Part II will discuss the over-the-counter (OTC)
swap market before and after the passage of Dodd-Frank. Part III
will present the arguments for and against a limited end-user
exception. Part IV will set forth a regulatory solution that
balances the interests of end-users without undermining the
intended investor protections of the bill.

II.

BACKGROUND

The financial crisis of the late 2000s revealed many flaws in
the regulatory framework of the securities industry. Congress
addressed a number of the faults in the financial system with the

5. JAMES OVERDAHL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS IN THE FEDERAL RULE-MAKING
PROCESS TO IMPLEMENT THE DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND

CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 1 (Aug. 30, 2010), available at
http://www.nera.com/nerafiles/PUBFinRegslDoddFrankRulemaking_0810
.pdf.
6. OVERDAHL, supra note 5.
7. See Commentary-Battle Over Banking (PBS Nightly Business Report
at
Sept.
16,
2010),
available
television
broadcast
http://www.pbs.org/nbr/site/onair/transcripts/battle_over bankingjreform_100
916/ (discussing the continued influence of the banking lobby). See also,
COMMODITIES FUTURES TRADING COMM'N, http://www.cftc.gov/LawRegulation
(last visited Sept. 29, 2011)
/DoddFrankAct/OTC_11_EndUser.htm1
(documenting the comments received from and agendas for meetings with the
parties who shared their opinions on a proposed rule or area of concern). In
this case, the area of concern is the end-user exception of Dodd-Frank. Id. The
range of interested parties includes organizations representing power
companies, farmers, and pension plans. Id. See, e.g., Press Release, Coalition
for Derivatives End-Users Views, Senate Discussion Draft as Significant Step
Backward Legislation Would Drive Capital Away From Job Creation and
Economic Growth (Nov. 10, 2009), available at http://www.reit.com/Po
licyPolitics/CreditMarketChallengesChanges//mediaPortals/OIPDFDodd%20
Discussion%20Draft%20Release.ashx (explaining that the Coalition is a broadbased group representing American businesses that uses over-the-counter
(OTC) derivatives to manage business risks, including fluctuating currency
exchange and interest rates, and commodity prices). The Coalition's primary
goal is to ensure continued access to OTC Derivatives for business end-users,
while protecting U.S. competitiveness and promoting economic growth. Id.
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passage of Dodd-Frank. 8 However, Dodd-Frank exempts certain
end-users from mandatory swap clearance and gives them the
option to continue to transact in the OTC derivatives market. 9 As
such, the pre-Dodd-Frank OTC derivatives market must be looked
at before discussing the merits of excluding certain entities from
mandatory swap clearance. Additionally, the proceeding
discussion of the credit default swap (CDS) market should not be
viewed in isolation, but rather should be viewed with the
knowledge that CDSs are merely one of several forms of swaps;
and while CDSs are unique in their form and function, the manner
in which they trade on the OTC market is not unique.' 0
At the core of the financial crisis was the multi-trillion dollar
OTC derivatives market.'1 An OTC derivative is "a bilateral,
privately-negotiated agreement that transfers risk from one party
to the other."12 While the term encompasses numerous financial
products, the OTC derivative most often associated with the
financial crisis is the CDS.13
A CDS is a credit derivative contract in which one party
(protection buyer) pays a periodic fee to another party (protection
seller) in return for compensation for default (or similar credit
event) by a reference entity.14 The reference entity is not a party to
8. Douglas J. Elliott, The Dodd-FrankFinancialReform Bill is a Valuable
Step

Forward,

THE

BROOKINGS

INST.

(June

25,

2010),

http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2010/0625_financial-reform elliott.aspx.
9. See Wall Street Transparency and Accountability Act of 2010 § 723, 7
U.S.C. 2(a)(1) (West 2010) (explaining that "[tihe application of the clearing
exception . . . is solely at the discretion of the counterparty to the swap that
meets the conditions . . . .").
10. See id. § 721 (stating that the act sets forth twenty-two different types
of swaps). Subsequent sections contain a discussion of swaps and how they are
used by end-users to mitigate risk. Id. See also Product Descriptions and
Frequently Asked Questions, INT'L SWAP DEALERS ASS'N, http://www.isda.org/
educat/faqs.html#9 (last visited Sept. 29, 2011) (providing industry definitions
for many of the swaps listed within the act).
11. See Gary Gensler, Chairman, Commodities Futures Trading Comm'n,
Testimony Before the Financial Crisis Inquiry Comm'n (July 1, 2010),
available at http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/Chairman
GaryGensler/opagensler-48.html (stating, "I believe that derivatives played a
central role in the 2008 financial crisis. Some have argued that the role of
derivatives is limited to AIG or credit default swaps. I think it is broader than
that. I also think we cannot just look to solve the immediate proximate causes
of the last crisis.").
12. INT'L SWAP DEALERS ASS'N, supra note 10.
13. See Gensler, supra note 11 (stating some believe credit default swaps
were the cause of the financial crisis).
14. INT'L SWAP DEALERS ASS'N, supra note 10. See also CHRISTIAN
WEISTROFFER, CREDIT DEFAULT SwAps: HEADING TOWARDS A MORE STABLE
SYSTEM 4 (Dec. 21, 2009), available at http://www.dbresearch.com
/PROD/DBRINTERNETEN-PROD/PRODOOOO0000252032.pdf (explaining
that, in addition to default, credit events which would trigger the credit
default swap include bankruptcy, obligation acceleration, failure to pay,
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the credit default swap.' 5 The amount of compensation received in
the event of a reference entity default is referred to as the notional
amount (or value) of the CDS.16 While similar to an insurance
contract against the risk of a credit event, a CDS does not require
the protection buyer to have an insurable interest in the reference
entity.' 7 As such, the protection buyer is able to take a short
position on the credit risk of the underlying entity through the
purchase of a CDS.1s
The terms of a CDS, like all OTC derivatives, are negotiated
directly between the protection buyer and protection seller.' 9 The
parties to an OTC derivatives contract are either end-users or
dealers. 20 (Note: the term end-user in this context does not
repudiation/moratorium, and restructuring; however, restructuring was
eliminated as a credit event in U.S. contracts in 2009).
15. INT'L SWAP DEALERS AsS'N, supra note 10.
16. DAVID MENGLE, CREDIT DERIVATIVES: AN OVERVIEW 1-2 (2007),
available at http://www.frbatlant a.org/filelegacydocs/erq4O7_mengle.pdf.
17. See Squam Lake Working Grp. on Financial Regulation, Credit Default
Swaps, Clearinghouses, and Exchanges 3 (Council on Foreign Relations Ctr.
for
Geoecon.
Studies,
Working
Paper,
2009),
available at
http://www.cfr.org/financial-crises/credit-default-swaps-clearinghousesexchanges/p19756 explaining that:
A credit default swap can be viewed as an insurance contract that
provides protection against a specific default. CDS contracts provide
protection against the default of a corporation, sovereign nation,
mortgage payers, and other borrowers. The buyer of protection makes
periodic payments, analogous to insurance premiums, at the CDS rate
specified in the contract. If the named borrower defaults, the seller of
protection must pay the difference between the principal amount
covered by the CDS and the market value of the debt.
18. See MENGLE, supra note 16, at 2 (stating that "[T]he risks assumed in a
credit default swap by the protection buyer and protection seller are not
symmetrical. The protection buyer effectively takes on a short position in the
credit risk of the reference entity, which thereby relieves the buyer of exposure
to default." (footnote omitted)).
19. See WEISTROFFER, supra note 14, at 20 (explaining, while the general
terms of the agreement are typically memorialized in an ISDA master
agreement that will apply to all swap transactions the parties enter, the
specific terms of each negotiated transaction are set forth in the swap
confirmation). See also MENGLE, supra note 16, at 4-5 (explaining such terms
include the reference entity, the payment to be paid to the protection buyer in
case of default, and the periodic fee to be paid to the protection seller); Austin
Murphy, The Largest Pyramid Scheme of All Time: The Effect of Allowing

Unregulated Credit Default Swaps 3 (Oakland Univ. Sch. of Bus. Admin.,
Working Paper Series, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1588089
(stating that in order to determine the period fee, brokers traditionally relied
heavily upon statistical models, which resulted in the gross mispricing of
CDSs and became apparent during the financial crisis).
20. See ROBERT E. LITAN, THE DERIVATIVES DEALERS' CLUB AND
DERIVATIVES MARKETS REFORM: A GUIDE FOR POLICY MAKERS, CITIZENS AND
OTHER
INTERESTED PARTIES 14
(Apr. 7, 2010),
available at
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2010/0407 derivativeslitan
/0407_derivatives litan.pdf (explaining the term "end-user" used in this
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necessarily refer to the same group of derivative users as "endusers" under Dodd-Frank.)21 Dealers are either large commercial
banks or broker-dealers that make a market in OTC derivatives. 22
On the other hand, end-users are government entities, private or
institutional investors, large corporations, or pension funds that
use derivatives to hedge risks or speculate. 23 The result is a
bifurcated market in which there is an interdealer market and a
dealer-to-customer market. 24
In OTC dealer-to-customer transactions, the dealer plays the
role of either protection buyer or seller. 25 One of the most infamous
players in the dealer-to-customer market during the financial
crisis was AIG.26 AIG falls into the institutional investor category
of end-user. 27 AIG is noteworthy due to the substantial un-hedged
position it took in the CDS market and because it accomplished
this feat by merely being the first company to use its AAA rating
28
to take a highly leveraged position in the CDS market.
In contrast, the interdealer market is used to transfer part of
the risks incurred by dealers in their transactions with customers
discussion can be further broken down into end-users, which "consist of
parties who purchase or sell derivatives primarily for hedging, notably private
companies and state and local governmental entities," and "[b]uy-side
participants includ[ing] institutional investors (insurance companies and
pension funds) and hedge funds," who use derivatives to hedge and speculate);
FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, PRELIMINARY STAFF REPORT OVERVIEW ON
DERIVATIVES 9 (June 29, 2010), available at http://www.feic.gov/reports
/pdfs/2010-0630-psr-derivative-overview.pdf.
21. See LITAN, supra note 20, at 3 (discussing derivatives users who fall
under the end-user category); but see infra Part III.
22. Id. at 9.
23. Id. at 10.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. See Gensler, supra note 11 (stating some believe the actions of AIG
were the cause of the financial crisis).
27. WEISTROFFER, supra note 14, at 6. See also, LITAN, supra note 20, at 17
(explaining that American Insurance Group is an insurance company and
therefore falls under the institutional investor category).
28. See Rend M. Stulz, Credit Default Swaps and the Credit Crisis, 24 J. OF
ECON. PERSPECTIVES 83 (2010), available at http://www.cob.ohiostate.edu/fin/faculty/stulz/publishedpapers/jep%2024%201.pdf (explaining that
AIG provided credit default swaps on AAA tranches in securitizations on an
extremely large scale). As of June 30, 2008, it had written a net amount of
$411 billion notional of credit derivatives on super-senior tranches of
securitizations. Id. Included among these were derivatives on super-senior
tranches with subprime collateral for a notional amount of $55.1 billion. Id.
See also, MICHAEL LEWIS, THE BIG SHORT: INSIDE THE DOOMSDAY MACHINE
78-79 (W. W. Norton & Co., 1st ed. 2010) (stating there was nothing
particularly special about AIG). In theory, any large AAA rated company could
have aggressively sold CDSs and many did. Id. As a result of their AAA credit
rating, companies such as Zurich, Credit Swiss, as well as other insurance
companies were able to take on the tremendous risk that is associated with
the issuance of large quantities of CDSs. Id.
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onto other dealers. 29 Interdealer transactions account for eighty
percent of all CDS positions.30 The process begins by brokers using
their positions as one of the few market makers in swaps to
leverage favorable prices from customers. 31 In turn, brokers decide
whether to remain entirely exposed to the acquired customer risk
or pass it off to other brokers by entering into opposite contracts
with other dealers. 32 Dealers profit from such transactions by
collecting a higher periodic fee from their customers than the
amount paid to the broker counterparty.3 3 The result is a highly
interconnected system in which only a few dealers are engaged in
the bilateral trading of CDSs. 34
While the dealer market is composed of more than twenty-five
banks, five of the largest dealers account for eighty-eight percent
of the total notional amount bought and sold in the interdealer
CDS market. 35 With such few participants in the market, dealers
are able to net the many offsetting transactions they have with
one another.3 6
The net risk exposure represents a broker's individual credit
risk.3 7 In contrast, gross notional exposure indicates a broker's
utmost risk exposure in that they will only experience such risk
exposure if all hedging counterparties fail. 38 However, due to the
significant dollar amounts involved, it would not take the failure of
all hedging counterparties to trigger a catastrophic financial
29. See LITAN, supra note 20, at 3 (stating that "the dealer banks, in turn,
transact heavily with each other, to hedge the risks from their customer trades
and somewhat less frequently, to trade for their own accounts.").
30. See id. at 14 (stating that "in the CDS market, for example, such dealerto-dealer transactions account for about 80 percent of all positions, and most of
these net out against each other.").
31. See id. at 17 (explaining that "end-users are totally dependent on their
dealers-often a particular dealer with whom they regularly conduct
business-to get the best price they can for their customers."). Furthermore:
End-users and buy-side participants cannot know whether that price is
the best one, since there is no pre or post trade transparency: they don't
know what other parties are willing to pay or to sell at, nor do they
have comparable real-time price data against which to compare the
price of their particular trade.
Id.
32. Id. at 14.
33. See LEWIS, supra note 28, at 76-77 (documenting that Goldman Sachs
sold CDS protection to a customer for a periodic fee of 2.5 percent and
purchased protection for the same swap from AIG for 0.12 percent; as such,
Goldman made two percent risk free).
34. See WEISTROFFER, supra note 14, at 6 (documenting in Chart 4 a visual
depiction of the relationship between end-users and dealers as well as the
interconnectivity of the dealer banks).
35. Id.
36. LITAN, supra note 20, at 14.
37. WEISTROFFER, supra note 14, at 13.

38. See id. at 13 (discussing why a large gross notional exposure does not
equate to a substantial credit risk).
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event. The net exposure of dealers, as a result of interdealer
transactions, is $3 trillion, in contrast, to a gross notional
interdealer total of $23 trillion.32 To put such large numbers in
context, the gross domestic product of the United States in 2009
was $14.25 trillion.40 As a result, the failure of one of the five
major bank-dealers would have a domino effect on the economy,
which would result in a financial meltdown. 41
Despite the systemic risk posed by the OTC derivatives
market, prior to the passage of Dodd-Frank, regulators had
virtually no regulatory authority over the market.42 In response,
Congress passed Title VII of Dodd-Frank, The Wall Street
Transparency and Accountability Act of 2010 (the Act). 43 The Act
provides a "comprehensive framework for the regulation of the
OTC swaps markets."44 Under the Act, the Commodity Futures
Trading Commission (CFTC) has jurisdiction over the regulation
of swaps, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has
jurisdiction over the regulation of securities-based swaps, and the
SEC and CFTC (together known as the Commissions) have cojurisdiction over mixed swaps. 4 5 The purpose of the Act is to
39. LITAN, supra note 20, at 14.
40. The World Factbook, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www.cia
.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/us.html (last visited Nov. 17,
2011).
41. See Murphy, supra note 19, at 5 (explaining that as a result of the
systemic risk posed by the failure of one of the major dealers, investors
assume the government will not allow the institutions to fail; as a result, the
CDSs issued by the major brokers are virtually guaranteed). Therefore, there
is a great incentive on the part of investors and brokers to continue to issue
CDSs. Id.
42. See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, supra note 20, at 19-20 (stating that
the first major step towards deregulating the OTC derivatives market
occurred in 1993 when the CFTC Chair promulgated a new rule which
exempted OTC derivatives from the Commodities Exchange Act (CEA), except
for prohibitions against fraud and manipulation, so long as they met certain
conditions). "These conditions included that they not be perfectly
standardized, that they expose market participants to counterparty credit
risk, that they not be multilaterally traded, and that both counterparties are
sophisticated investors." Id. In December of 2000, Congress exempted OTC
swap derivatives from the CEA when the Commodity Futures Modernization
Act was passed as a rider to the Omnibus Appropriations bill for fiscal year
2001. Id. Congress did, however, permit "the Securities and Exchange
Commission to retain anti-fraud authority over securities-based OTC
derivatives such as stock options." Id. As such, the financial regulatory
agencies lacked the authority to regulate the OTC swap markets in the years
leading up to and during the financial crisis. Id.
43. Wall Street Transparency and Accountability Act of 2010 § 701, 15
U.S.C. § 8301.
44. Dodd
Frank
Act
Rule
Making:
Derivatives,
SEC,
http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/dodd-frank/derivatives.shtml (last visited Sept.
29, 2011).
45. The Wall Street Transparency and Accountability Act of 2010 § 723.
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reduce systemic risk, increase market transparency, and promote
market integrity within the financial system. 46 These goals are
accomplished, in part, by mandating the clearance of qualified
swaps. 47 Qualified swaps will be cleared by a registered
clearinghouse. 48
The clearinghouse functions as a third party who guarantees
the financial obligations of the parties to the swap. 49 This is
accomplished by requiring parties to post margin, or collateral, at
the outset of the transaction and on daily losses.50 The level of
required margin will be determined by the clearinghouses and the
Commissions.5 1
In the past, many OTC derivatives contracts required the
parties to post margin. 52 However, the levels were often
insufficient to adequately guarantee compliance with the
contractual obligations in the event of counterparty default.58 Nor
46. Agricultural Swaps, 75 Fed. Reg. 187, 59666 (proposed Sept. 28, 2010)
(to be codified at 17 C.F.R. 35.1).
47. Wall Street Transparency and Accountability Act of 2010 § 723.
48. See MARK JICKLING & KATHLEEN ANN RUANE, THE DODD-FRANK WALL
STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT: TITLE VII, DERIVATIVES 3
n.5 (Aug. 30, 2010), available at http://www.1lsdc.org/attachments
/files/239/CRS-R41398.pdf (stating that clearinghouses are "also referred to as
a central counterparty or as a derivatives clearing organization (DCO)").
49. See id. (explaining that "once the trade is made, it goes to the
clearinghouse, which guarantees payment to both parties.").
50. See id. (stating that prior to entering into the trade, the swap
counterparties "deposit an initial margin payment with the clearinghouse to
cover potential losses.").
Then at the end of each trading day, all contracts are repriced, or
"marked to market," and all those who have lost money (because prices
moved against them) must post additional margin (called variation or
maintenance margin) to cover those losses before the next trading
session. This is known as a margin call: traders must make good on
their losses immediately, or their broker may close out their positions
when trading opens the next day.
Id.
51. See id. at 2 (explaining that because swap dealers and major swap
participants must trade their swaps on an exchange regulated by either the
SEC or CFTC, they will be subject to margin requirements above and beyond
those of the clearinghouse).
52. See id. at 4 (explaining that in the past some parties included margin
requirements in their swap contracts). "[T]he International Swap Dealers
Association published best practice standards for use of collateral." Id.
However, because compliance with the standards was not mandatory and all
terms of the swap contracts were negotiable, the terms of the margin
provisions, when actually included in the contracts, varied greatly. Id.
53. See id. at 5 (stating, for example, in the case of AIG, many of the
contracts required it to post collateral with the occurrence of certain credit
events, such as a decline in the credit quality of the underlying referenced
securities or AIG's own credit rating). However, as a result of AIG's triple-A
credit rating, counterparties did not require AIG to post initial margin. Id. "As
the subprime crisis worsened, AIG faced margin calls that it could not meet."
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did the bilateral margin levels reflect the systemic risk posed by
the default of one of the parties. 54 The clearing and margin
requirements address these issues by limiting the size of a firm's
cleared position to their ability to post margin to cover their
losses.55
Upon clearance, the Act mandates that certain swap data,
such as price and volume, be publicly reported in real-time.5 6 The
reporting requirement is consistent with the intent of the act in
that it enhances price discovery.5 7
With some limited exceptions, swaps that are required to be
cleared must also be exchange traded.58 In such cases, the parties
Id. But for the intervention of the Federal Reserve and Treasury, AIG would
have declared bankruptcy and triggered a global financial meltdown. Id.
54. See LITAN, supra note 20, at 16 (explaining that in the OTC interdealer
swap market, dealers were not required to post margin due to their high credit
ratings). Additionally, the netting of transaction further reduced any apparent
need for the posting of margin. Id. After the financial crisis of 2008, but before
the passage of Dodd-Frank, brokers began to require trades to be crossmargined, however, the terms of these margin agreements were negotiated
and thus it is uncertain whether the margin was sufficient. Id. at 14. Further
complicating the margin requirements in the OTC system is the fact that,
when asking for collateral, parties do not consider the "potential cascade of
losses that one party's default could impose directly on other parties, as well
as the potential indirect impacts of these losses on the counterparties of other
buyers." Id. at 16.
55. See JICKLING & RUANE, supra note 48 (explaining that the "intended
effect of margin requirements is to eliminate the possibility that any firm can
build up an uncapitalized exposure so large that default would have systemic
consequences.").
56. Wall Street Transparency and Accountability Act of 2010 § 727. See also
JICKLING & RUANE, supra note 48, at 11 ("Real-time reporting means to report
data relating to a swap transaction, including price and volume, as soon as
technologically practicable after the time at which the swap transaction has
been executed.").
57. See Pricing and Price Discovery Issues, OKLA. STATE UNIV.,
http://agecon.okstate.edu/pricing/ (last visited Sept. 29, 2011) (explaining that
as a derivative, swap price, volume, and volatility aid in the price discovery of
the underlying asset). Price discovery is the process by which buyers and
sellers arrive at a transaction price for a given quantity and price of an asset.
Id. "It involves several interrelated concepts, among them market structure
(number, size, location, and competitiveness of buyers and sellers); market
behavior (buyer procurement and pricing methods); market information and
price reporting (amount, timeliness, and reliability of information); and
futures markets and risk management alternatives."); see, e.g., DAVID
MENGLE, INT'L SWAP DEALERS Ass'N RESEARCH NOTES - TRANSPARENCY AND
OVER-THE-COUNTER DERIVATIVES: THE ROLE OF TRANSACTION TRANSPARENCY

7 (2009), available at http://www.isda.org/researchnotes/pdf/ISDA-ResearchNotes1.pdf (explaining that in the corporate bond and bank loan markets
where there is very little price transparency, the price, volume, and volatility
of the credit default swaps on the underlying bond or loan provides guidance
for pricing the credit portion of the asset price).
58. See JICKLING & RUANE, supra note 48 (explaining that while the
clearance and exchange trading requirements are distinct, a swap that must
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to the swap agree to the transaction on either a trading floor or
electronic platform.5 9 The goal of the exchange-trading
requirement is to enhance pre-trade price transparency.6 0
However, the Act presumes some swaps will continue to be
traded OTC.61 For example, swaps that fall under the end-user
exception will have the option to be traded OTC.62 A transaction
qualifies for the end-user exception if one of the counterparties to
the swap "is not a financial entity; is using swaps to hedge or
mitigate commercial risk; and notifies the Commission, in a
manner set forth by the Commission, how it generally meets its
financial obligations associated with entering into non-cleared
swaps."63
While the exception may appear complete, much has been left
to the Commissions to decide. 64 While Congress has provided a
framework in which the debate over the proper scope of the enduser exception will occur, the Commissions are charged with
defining the scope of the exception.65
be cleared must also be exchanged traded under all but a few circumstances).
There are two ways in which a swap may be required to be exchanged traded.
Id. First, the Commissions are required to engage in an ongoing review of the
products they have jurisdiction over to determine whether a particular swap
should be subject to the clearing requirement. Id. Second, a swap may be
subjected to the exchange trading requirement upon submission to the CFTC
or the SEC. Id.
59. See id. at 7 (stating that exchange trading will "be executed on a
regulated exchange or on a trading platform defined in the act as a swaps
execution facility (SEF) or a security-based swaps execution facility
(SBSEF).").
60. See id. (explaining that the exchange trading requirement corrects the
opaqueness of the OTC market, where "complete price information was
available only to dealers, and swaps customers were limited in their ability to
shop for the best price or rate.").
61. Id. at 5.
62. Wall Street Transparency and Accountability Act of 2010 § 712.
63. Id.
64. See Letter from the Coalition of Derivatives End-Users, to Elizabeth
Murphy, Sec'y, SEC, and David A. Stawick, Sec'y, U.S. Commodity Futures
Trading Comm'n (Sept. 20, 2010), availableat http://www.cftc.gov/ucmlgroups
/public/@swaps/documents/dfsubmission/dfsubmission 092810105_0.pdf
(explaining that "the Commissions' interpretation of the terms set out in the
ANPR ... could affect Coalition members' businesses significantly."). "At stake
is the liquidity of the end-user community, as margin requirements could tie
up billions of dollars of funds that otherwise could be put to productive use."
Id.
65. See External Meetings, U.S. COMMODITIES FUTURES TRADING COMM'N,
http://cftc.gov/LawRegulation/DoddFrankAct/ExternalMeetings/index.htm
(last visited Nov. 3, 2011) (listing the meetings various members of the CFTC
have had with the various groups and businesses in which portions of DoddFrank have been discussed). See also Letter from the Coalition of Derivatives
End-Users, supra note 64, at 3 (explaining that the definition of major swap
participant, substantial position, substantial counterparty exposure, and
commercial risk, will play a major role in the establishment of the scope of the
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III. ARGUMENT
The struggle to define the scope of the end-user exception is
one with tremendous consequences. A definition that is too narrow
could have a significant impact on corporate hedging activities and
potentially result in job losses. A definition that is too broad could
undermine the intent of the Act and result in the creation of the
next financial crisis.66
While Congress clearly decided some groups of derivatives
end-users should be exempted from the swap clearance, it did not
provide a clear indication of the scope of the exception.6 7 Therefore,
it is up to the Commissions to determine where the arguments for
and against end-user swap clearance fit with the intent of
Congress. This discussion will begin by addressing the arguments
for a broad end-user exception. It will then turn to the arguments
made by those in favor of a narrow exception.
A. The Scope of the End-User Exception Should Be Broad
Advocates of a broad end-user exception contend the costs
associated with clearance are disproportionate to the risks related
to the use of swaps for hedging by end-users.
1. The Use of Swamps by End-Users for Hedging Purposes
Improves Corporateand Systemic Stability.
A central purpose of the Act is to prevent systemic risk, which
was a problem at the center of the financial crisis. 68 Proponents of
exception).
66. See KEYBRIDGE RES., AN ANALYSIS OF THE BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE'S
SURVEY ON OVER-THE-COUNTER DERIVATIVES (Apr. 14, 2010), available at
http://businessroundtable.org/uploads/studies-reports/downloads/AnAnalysis
of theBusinessRoundtablesSurvey-onOver-the-CounterDerivatives.pdf
(documenting seventy-two percent of survey respondents, of which sixty-two
percent were non-financial firms, reported that a margin impact would have a
significant impact on their hedging activities). The report also states that the
imposition of a three percent margin requirement would result in the loss of
between 100,000 and 120,000 jobs. Id. See also LEWIS, supra note 28, at 78-79
(discussing the fact that AIG was not unique, but rather it was because of its
AAA credit rating that it was able to accumulate such a substantial un-hedged
CDS position). As a result, should the scope of the end-user exception not be
sufficiently narrow, the door remains wide open for the creation of another
AIG. Id. at 80.
67. See JICKLING & RUANE, supra note 48, at 12-13 (explaining that the
scope of the end-user exception will in part depend upon the number of firms
that are named major swap participants which in the end will be determined
by SEC and CFTC rulemakings).
68. See Agricultural Swaps, supra note 46, at 59667 (explaining that "the
legislation was enacted to reduce risk, increase transparency, and promote
market integrity within the financial system."). See also 156 CONG. REC.
S3569, 3601 (daily ed. May 12, 2010) (statement of Sen. Christopher Dodd)
(stating the bill includes "tough requirements for central clearing, exchange
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a broad end-user exception contend swaps used for hedging pose a
far lower degree of risk than swaps used for speculating.6 9
70
The primary function of OTC derivatives is to transfer risk.
By definition under the Act, end-users use swaps to hedge
commercial risks.7 ' Should an end-user enter into a swap
transaction for speculative purposes, then that end-user will likely
lose the exception. 72 Further, when end-users transact in swaps to
hedge, they do so to reduce or eliminate risks, as a result, the
73
value of the company is not impacted by the use of the swaps.
This is true because when an end-user's hedges are down, the
underlying hedged item is up, and vice versa. 74
Through the use of negotiated swaps, end-users are able to
tailor their hedges to their unique risks.75 As a result, end-users do
not experience basis risk, which is the assumption of additional
risk that results from the use of instrumentalities that do not
perfectly address the risks of end-users.76 Therefore, the use of
trading, capital margin, and reporting that they are critical to reducing
systemic risk and ensuring that taxpayers would not have to clean up the
mess resulting from another AIG implosion.").
69. See Letter from the Coalition of Derivatives End-Users, supra note 64,
at 8 (explaining that by definition hedges are used to reduce risk whereas
speculation increase risk).
70. See MENGLE, supra note 57, at 2 (stating "in the case of OTC
derivatives, the primary function of the market is the transfer of risk and not
the transfer of debt or equity.").
71. See Wall Street Transparency and Accountability Act of 2010 § 712, 15
U.S.C. § 8302 (stating one of the requirements of the exception is the party
must use swaps "to hedge or mitigate commercial risk").
72. See id. (stating an end-user may not be a financial entity, and the
definition of a financial entity includes a major swap participant). See also
Wall Street Transparency and Accountability Act of 2010 § 721, 7 U.S.C. § la
(defining major swap participant as an entity "who maintains a substantial
position in swaps for any of the major swap categories as determined by the
Commission, excluding ... positions held for hedging or mitigating commercial
risk."). As such, while much depends upon how the Commissions define
substantial position and hedging, what is certain is that the use of swaps for
purposes other than hedging could jeopardize an end-user's qualification for
the exception. Id.
73. See Letter from the Coalition of Derivatives End-Users, supra note 64,
at 8 (stating that "the enterprise value of a firm that enters into swaps only for
the purposes of hedging-as opposed to speculation-is not impacted by its use
of derivatives.").
74. Id.
75. See, e.g., COMMODITIES FUTURES TRADING COMM'N, STAFF REPORT:
COMM'N
WITH
TRADERS
& INDEX
DEALERS
SWAP
COMMODITY

RECOMMENDATIONS 11 (Sept. 2008), available at http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/gro
9
ups/public/@newsroom/documents/file/cftcstaffreportonswapdealersO .pdf
(explaining that swaps allow airlines to hedge future jet fuel prices because a
futures contract for jet fuel does not exist). Without the availability of swaps,
airlines would need to enter into contracts for crude oil and heating oil. Id.
76. See id. at 11-12 (explaining while contracts for crude and heating oil
provide some hedge for jet fuel, the prices of crude and heating oil do not move
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swaps by end-users decreases the likelihood of bankruptcy and, as
such, increases systemic stability.7 7
Swaps are most commonly used by end-users to hedge against
interest-rate and currency risks.78 The use of such swaps creates
little counterparty risk while maintaining corporate stability.
Interest-rate swaps are regularly used by corporations to hedge
against fluctuations in interest rates on outstanding variable-rate
loans.79
For example, a manufacturer who wants to convert a floating
interest-rate loan into a fixed interest-rate loan would use an
interest-rate swap.80 This is accomplished by entering into a
separate contract with a financial institution in which the
manufacturer agrees to pay a flat rate of interest in return for the
payment of a floating rate of interest.8 ' As a result, the
manufacturer is left with a fixed interest rate because the floating
interest rate on the loan is offset by the floating interest rate paid
by the financial institution. 82 Notably, the manufacturer and the
financial institution do not exchange the principal on which the
payments are based. 83 As such, the risk to the counterparties in
the case of default is limited to the cost of finding a new swap to
fix the broken one because the counterparties will discontinue the
payments that were due to the counterparty under the contract.84
Similarly, currency swaps pose little risk to swap
perfectly together with the price of jet fuel and, as a result, airlines experience
additional risk known as basis risk).
77. See DON M. CHANCE, AN INTRODUCTION TO DERIVATIVES AND RISK
MANAGEMENT 346 (Thomson S.-W. 6th ed. 2004) (stating that by hedging,
firms reduce risks including the probability of bankruptcy); see also 156 CONG.
REC. S3569, 3602 (daily ed. May 12, 2010) (statement of Sen. Christopher
Dodd) (explaining that the use of swaps as hedges is crucial in making sure
companies do not fail for reasons unrelated to their own difficulties).
78. See KARSTEN VON KLEIST & CARLOS MALLO, BANK FOR INT'L
SETTLEMENTS OTC DERIVATIVES MARKET ACTIVITY IN THE SECOND HALF OF
2009 7-8 (May 2010), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/otc-hy1005.pdf
(providing a chart of the interest-rate and currency swap markets in 2009).
Notably, the number of outstanding interest-rate swaps substantially exceeds
all other swaps. Id.
79. See CHANCE, supra note 77, at 437 (explaining that corporations tend to
prefer to lend at variable rates, therefore, lower interest rates are generally
charged). Chance also explains that this swap transaction is known as a plain
vanilla swap. Id.
80. Letter from the Coalition of Derivatives End-Users, supra note 64, at
12.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. See CHANCE, supra note 77, at 425, 428 (explaining an exchange of
notional principal is not necessary because the parties would simply be
exchanging the same amount of money).
84. See LITAN, supra note 20, at 15 (explaining that the costs to the interest
rate swap counterparty in case of a default would be limited to the cost of
finding a replacement for the failed swap).
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counterparties while providing end-users a hedge for transactions
based in foreign currencies.85 The means by which this is
accomplished vary depending upon the type of transaction that is
being hedged.86
In one scenario, an American technology company (Techo)
seeks to expand its operations in Europe, which will cost C10
million. Rather than taking out a loan denominated in euro, Techo
borrows the equivalent in dollars ($13 million) from an American
bank and then enters into a currency swap with a swap dealer
(JAL). The terms of the swap provide that Techo will initially pay
$13 million to JAL which will in turn pay Techo the C10 million it
needs for expansion.8 7 The parties will then periodically pay each
other a simulated interest rate.88 Techo, using revenues from its
European operations, pays JAL in euros and JAL pays Techo in
dollars.8 9 At the conclusion of the contract, Techo will pay JAL C10
million and JAL will pay Techo $13 million, which it will then use
to pay off the dollar-denominated loan.90
As a result of the swap, Techo hedged against fluctuations in
the dollar-euro exchange rate for the period of the contract. 9 ' By
converting its European revenues to dollars at a fixed rate, Techo
is able to use its European revenues to pay the dollar-denominated
loan interest payments without bearing the risk of volatility in the
foreign-exchange market. 92 Once again, the counterparties face
85. See id. (explaining that, like interests rate swaps, currency swaps pose
little systemic or counterparty risk due to the availability of replacement
swaps in the event of counterparty default).
86. See CHANCE, supra note 77, at 447, 449 (explaining that, in addition to
using a currency swap to convert a dollar denominated loan into a foreign
currency, a party may use a currency swap to hedge a stream of foreign cash
flows). Meaning, a corporation who has foreign operations that derive
revenues in the local currency may use a currency swap to convert the local
currencies into dollars at a fixed rate of exchange. Id. As a result, the
corporation has hedged against volatility in the foreign exchange market. Id.
Under this arrangement, the corporation does bear the risk that the revenues
generated by its foreign operations will be less than the amount contracted to
under the swap. Id. However, this risk is inherent to the hedging of foreign
cash flows and is assumed irrespective of the type of derivative used to hedge.
Id.
87. See id. at 442 (explaining that this initial exchange of currency has zero
value).
88. See id. at 439, 443 (explaining how the value of the period payments to
each party are calculated). The intent of the interest payment is to mimic the
interest rate of a bond denominated in either euros or dollars. Id.
89. Id.
90. See id. at 441 (explaining that at the end of the life of the swap, the
dollar euro exchange rate will not be the same as it was upon initiation of the
transaction and, as a result, the parties will experience gains and losses).
91. Id.
92. See id. at 447 (explaining that the relationship allows the American
counterparty to essentially take out a loan in dollars and repay using profits
denominated in euros).
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only minimal risk in the event of counterparty default.9 3
Further, it is argued by supporters of a broad exception that
even if an end-user were to default, that end-user is not so
interconnected that a default would trigger a systemic collapse. 94
The typical end-user has counterparties numbering in the low
double digits, as compared to Lehman Brothers, which transacted
with over 8000 parties.9 5 As such, it is highly unlikely that a
typical end-user would be the source of systemic "contagion."96
Additionally, some advocates are quick to point out that endusers, by definition, cannot accumulate such a swap position that
their failure would create systemic risk.97 Before an end-user could
accumulate such a substantial position, it would become a major
swap participant and, as such, would no longer be exempt from
clearing.98
2. The FinancialCosts of ClearanceAre Not Justified by the Risk
Posed by End- Users.
Supporters of a broad exception also argue that because the
use of swaps by end-users pose such little risk, end-users should
not be subjected to the same transaction costs as those who use
swaps to speculate, which by definition creates risk.99
Additionally, end-users were not the cause of the financial
crisis.100 Therefore, advocates of a broad exception contend that
93. See id. at 448 (stating that the American company that borrows in
dollars assumes the risk of default of the swap dealer). Should the dealer
default the company will be exposed to exchange rate volatility while it
searches for a replacement swap. Id. See also LITAN, supra note 20, at 15
(stating that there are systemic risks in the interest rate and currency swap
markets, which include all swap users, but the risks are less dangerous than
those in the CDS market).
94. See Letter from the Coalition of Derivatives End-Users, supra note 64,
at 8 (discussing the fact that "[e]xcessive interconnectedness is not a condition
that afflicts end-users.").
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. See Derivatives End-user Exception, ECON. OF CONTEMPT, (Apr. 18,
2010, 7:58 PM), http://economicsofcontempt.blogspot.com/2010/04/derivativesend-user-exception.html (stating "commercial end-users by definition aren't
big enough users of swaps to pose a systemic risk.") (emphasis in the original).

98. Id.
99. See Letter from the Coalition of Derivatives End-Users, supra note 64,
at 9 (explaining that because swap dealers and major swap participants use
swaps for speculative purposes they add risk). As such, the argument is that it
is unjustified to subject those who have an arguably stabilizing effect on the
economic system to the same economic costs as those who have a potentially
destabilizing effect on the system. Id.
100. See Letter from the Coalition of Derivatives End-Users, supra note 64,
at 2 (stating "[m]oreover, end-users, who did not contribute to the financial
markets crisis, should not be subjected to the same regulatory structure as
swap dealers and those who do not use derivatives to reduce risks associated
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end-users should neither be subjected to the same costs as those
entities that caused the financial crisis, nor should they be forced
to pay for the increased reserves to back the system, through
margin requirements. 101 As Senator Saxby Chambliss stated
during debate on Dodd-Frank: "Why is Congress considering
slapping an additional cost on [end-users] in the form of a clearing
mandate? This does not make sense, when these individual
companies are the true end-users of the products they are trading
in, and they were absolutely not the cause of the financial
meltdown."102
The Costs Associated with a Narrow Definition FarExceed Any
Benefit.
In addition, advocates of a broad definition argue a narrow
definition of end-user would deter hedging and cause job losses.
The vast majority of swap users report that mandatory
centralized clearing by financial institutions will increase their
hedging costs.' 0 3 These costs will be far greater if a narrow
definition of end-user was adopted. 104 As a result of the increased
costs, end-users will be likely to hedge less and, as a result, be
exposed to greater volatility.105
Further, the additional costs will require end-users to set
aside a substantial amount of capital.106 As a result, it is estimated
that capital spending will be dramatically reduced and lead to the
3.

loss of 100,000 to 120,000 jobs.107
with their businesses."). See also, Joe Miller & Brooks Jackson, Who Caused
the Economic Crisis?, FACTCHECK.ORG (Oct. 1, 2008), http://www.factcheck.org
/elections-2008/who caused the economic-crisis.html (listing the causes of the
financial crisis and notably absent from the list is corporate users of swaps to
hedge risk).
101. LITAN, supra note 20, at 15.
102. 156 CONG. REc. S3569, 3596 (daily ed. May 12, 2010) (statement of Sen.
Saxby Chambliss).
103. See GREENWICH Assocs., GLOBAL COMMODITIES: DERIVATIVES RULES
TO INCREASE HEDGING COSTS 2 (Sept. 2010), available at http://www.gr
eenwich.com/WMAlgreenwichreports/showjreports/1,1624,,00.html?prodCatI
that,
(stating
d=4&regionId=6&rtOrigin=S&vgnvisitor=eKObm6OIopo=
according to their survey, seventy-seven percent of respondents see the margin
requirement and costs associated as a potential drawback to central clearing).
104. Id. at 1 (explaining that "companies fear even more damaging
consequences if regulators were to adopt a narrow definition of the 'end-user'
exception that limited the type of user that could qualify.").
105. See Letter from the Coalition of Derivatives End-Users, supra note 64,
at 2 (stating that the increased costs in swaps could result in companies
moving their swap operations overseas or cause them to forgo hedging
altogether).
106. See id. (stating that according to a survey by the Business Roundtable,
a three percent margin requirement would require firms to set aside $33.1
billion in aggregate collateral).
107. See id. (explaining that "the initial margin requirement could reduce
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Additionally, because of the added costs to end-users,
Chairman Dodd and Chairman Lincoln explicitly stated it was not
the intent of Congress to impose margin requirements on endusers.108 As such, regulators may not impose margin and capital
requirements on end-users.109 In order to ensure margin costs are
not passed onto end-users, financial entities that enter into uncleared swaps with qualified end-users should also enjoy the
exception.110
B. The Scope of the End-User Exception Should Be Narrow
Advocates of a narrow end-user exception argue a broad
definition could be easily exploited, undermining the integrity of
the bill and exposing end-users to unjustified risks.
1. A Broad End-User Exception May Be Exploited by End-Users
and Undermine the Intent of the Bill.
Advocates for a narrow definition of end-user argue that a
broad end-user exception will create a giant regulatory loophole
that could be exploited by financial institutions. 1 ' The ability and
willingness of financial institutions to quickly and substantially
adjust to advantageous changes in the procedural and regulatory
environment is exemplified by the CDS market between 1997 and
2005 when it grew from $18 billion notional to $17 trillion.112
capital spending by $5 to $6 billion per year, thus causing a loss of 100,000 to
120,000 jobs.").
108. Letter from Christopher Dodd, Chairman, Senate Comm. on Banking &
Blanche Lincoln, Chairman, Senate Comm. on Agric., to Barney Frank,
Chairman, H. Fin. Servs. Comm. & Colin Peterson, Chairman, H. Comm. on
Agric. (June 30, 2010), available at http://www.truebluenaturalgas.org/wpcontent/uploads/2011/07/2010-06-3ODo ddLincolnEndUserLetter.pdf.
109. Id. (explaining that while regulators are charged with establishing
rules, they may not create rules that impose margin and capital requirements
on end-users).
110. See Letter from Daniel S.M. Dolan, Vice President, Pol'y Research &
Commc'ns Elec. Power Supply Ass'n, to David A. Stawick, Sec'y, Commodities
Futures Trading Comm'n (Aug. 23, 2010), available at http://www.cftc.gov
/ucm/groups/public/@swaps/documents/dfsubmission/dfsubmission5_082310ddolan.pdf (stating that any margin requirements imposed upon swap
counterparties will be passed down to end-users and thus increase costs of
hedging).
111. Ronald D. Orol, Gensler Takes Aim at Derivatives Exceptions in Bank
Bill, MARKET WATCH (Apr. 13, 2010, 3:45 PM), http://www.marketwatc
h.com/story/gensler-takes-aim-at-derivatives-exceptions-2010-04- 13 (quoting
Simon Johnson, Massachusetts Institute of Technology Sloan School of
Management, who explains the exception could be used as a "loophole that
allows financial institutions to take risk off their balance sheet so that
regulators don't have the full picture of each institution's risk to the financial
system.").
112. MIKE JACKOLOW, CREDIT DEFAULT SWAP INDEX OPTIONS: EVALUATING
THE VIABILITY OF A NEW PRODUCT FOR THE CBOE 3 (June 2, 2006), available
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Therefore, it is foreseeable that if the scope of the end-user
exception is broad, financial institutions will purchase companies
for the purpose of exploiting the end-user exception.1 13
Further, advocates of a narrow exception claim end-users
could use their AAA credit rating and the end-user exception to
secretly acquire substantial derivatives positions.114 It was the

AAA credit ratings of AIG and Enron that permitted the
companies to acquire the substantial derivatives positions that
ultimately led to the failure of the companies.1 15 If the scope of the
exception is broad enough that it permits another AIG to arise, the
intent of Dodd-Frank will be undermined and real reform will not
be achieved.116
2. By Not Posting Margin, End-Users Are Exposed to Risks That
Are Not Justified by Any Cost Savings.
The end-user exception allows banks to continue to determine
if and when end-users should post collateral and the amount
required. 117 Therefore, the exception does not eliminate the credit
exposure that results from the risk of end-user default.11 8 In the
at
http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/researchlfimrc/papers/jakola.pdf
(stating the rapid growth in the CDS market "was spurred by the ISDA
creating a set of standardized documentation."). See also FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY
COMM'N, supra note 20, at 19-20 (discussing the exclusion of swaps from
regulatory oversight in 2000); 156 CONG. REC. S3569, 3601 (daily ed. May 12,
2010) (Sen. Christopher Dodd) (explaining that in the 14 years between 1994
and 2006, the derivatives market went from $12.1 trillion to $600 trillion and
during that time it went almost entirely underground).
113. See Orol, supra note 111 (quoting Simon Johnson who states
"investment banks will buy non-financial corporations so they can take their
transactions off of clearinghouses.").
114. See Steven Pearlstein, Big Business Pleads for Loopholes in Financial
Regulatory
Reform,
WASH.
POST,
Apr.
30,
2010,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/04/29/AR2010
042904698.html (discussing how, as a result of AAA credit ratings, firms are
allowed to acquire substantial swap positions without putting down margin).
115. See id. (citing the secret use of swaps and derivatives by AIG and Enron
resulted in the derivatives divisions controlling the firm). See also LEWIS,
supra note 28 (discussing how AIG was not unique, but rather they were the
first AAA firm to begin to take a substantial position in the CDS market).
116. See 156 CONG. REC. S3569, 3598 (daily ed. May 12, 2010) (statement of
Sen. Blanche Lincoln) (stating "If we do not capture the AIGs of the world, we
cannot claim to have real reform.").
117. See JICKLING & RUANE, supra note 48, at 4-5 (stating that the end-user
exception allows the parties to continue to trade OTC and part of the OTC
framework was the ability of banks to determine when and how much margin
was to be required).
118. See Wallace C. Turbeville, Dangerous Trader Mentality and Financial
Reform, NEW DEAL 2.0 (May 4, 2010, 10:09 AM), http://www.newdeal20

.org/2010/05/04/dangerous-trader-mentality-and-financial-reform-10393/
(stating "every trade involves credit exposures, risks that losses will be
experienced if the opposing party defaults.").
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absence of collateral, banks bear the credit exposure.119 Because
banks have a finite capacity for credit exposure to any single enduser, the use of the credit exposure to cover trading deficits takes
away from the end-user's credit capacity to invest and manage
cash flow variances. 120 As such, end-user trading activities expose
the company to the risk that they will be unable to manage
12
incidents such as those seasonal differences in income. 1
Additionally, when end-users post margin, the bilateral
contracts do not require banks to reciprocate. 122 As such, end-users
123
remain exposed to the risk of default by the banks.
Further, the assumption of these risks is not justified by any
cost savings. Carrying credit exposure risk is the same as making
a loan.124 So long as the parties are correctly pricing the
25
transaction, there is a cost associated with making the loan.1
Also, the cost of posting collateral is not the cost of the collateral
because it is returned so long as there is no default.126 Therefore,
the true cost of posting margin is "the difference between the cost
of borrowing the funds used as collateral and the investment
127
return on the collateral while it is posted."
IV.

PROPOSAL

The SEC and CFTC face the "daunting task" of promulgating
the rules and definitions that will determine the legal scope of the
end-user exception. 128 The result of this process should be an enduser exception that complies with the intent of the Act. This
119. See id. (explaining that "[c]redit exposures created by bi-lateral trading
can be addressed in one of two ways: a party can post cash or collateral to
cover the exposure, or the counterparty whose position has increased in value
can forego [sic] posting and simply bear the credit exposure.").
120. See id. (stating that due to a bank's capacity for credit exposure, there
is a proportional relationship between the credit capacity used for trading
activities, such as swap transactions, and the capacity available to lend for
other purposes).
121. See id. (citing seasonal differences in income as an example of a cash
flow variance).
122. See LITAN, supra note 20, at 14 (explaining that banks often require
customers to post margin, but they do not in turn post initial margin to
customers).
123. See Wallace C. Turbeville, The End (User) Game, NEW DEAL 2.0 (May 5,
2010, 11:42 AM), http://www.newdeal20.org/2010/05/05/the-end-user-game10497/ (stating that end-users do not have the market power to demand that
financial institutions post collateral, despite the necessity of such a
requirement as was exhibited by the failure of Lehman Brothers).
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. See S. Rep. No. 111-238, at 81, 118 (detailing the many new duties
placed upon the agencies, calling the CFTC's task daunting and stating the
SEC's increase in responsibilities is significant).
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section begins by setting forth the proper scope of the exception. It
then addresses the methods for achieving and maintaining an
exception of proper scope.
A.

The ProperScope of the End-User Exception Is Found Within
Dodd-Frank

The ultimate intent of Article VII of the Dodd-Frank Act is to
prevent another global financial meltdown by lowering systemic
risk and increasing the transparency of financial markets. 129 This
is partially accomplished through clearance and exchange trading
of swaps.130 At the same time, Dodd-Frank exempts end-users
from mandatory clearance.11 Because legitimate end-users do not
create systemic risk the exception is consistent with the intent of
the Act.132 Additionally, in creating the exception, Congress
decided that because end-users were not responsible for the crisis
they should not be subjected to increased hedging costs. 3 3
Therefore, the end-user exception must be sufficiently narrow to
exclude all parties who increase systemic risk and who were the
cause of the crisis, namely, speculators,13 4 while at the same time
is broad enough to encompass all end-users.135
129. See Gary Gensler, Chairman, Commodities Futures Trading Comm'n,
Remarks Before FIA Futures and Options Expo (Nov. 3, 2010), available at
http://www.cftc.gov/pressroom/speechestestimony/opagensler-57.html
(stating
that the CFTC will comply with the intent of Dodd-Frank, which is the
reduction of systemic risk and increase in transparency, when engaging the
rule-making process).
130. See Wall Street Transparency and Accountability Act of 2010 § 723
(mandating that all nonexempt trades are cleared and all nonexempt
standardized swap transactions are carried out on an exchange).
131. Id. at § 712.
132. See Letter from the Coalition of Derivatives End-Users, supra note 64,
at 2, 8 (explaining, that by definition, hedges are used to reduce risk whereas
speculation increases risk). Therefore, end-users should not be subjected to
any increase in hedging costs and any increase will likely result in end-users
hedging less or not hedging at all. Id.
133. Letter from Christopher Dodd, supranote 108.
134. See Gary Gensler, Chairman, Commodities Futures Trading Comm'n,
Remarks Before the Exchequer Club of Washington: OTC Derivatives Reform
(Nov.
18,
2009),
available at
http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/Spee
(discussing the
chesTestimony/ChairmanGaryGensler/opagensler-20.html
clearance and exchange trading requirements are not intended to punish but
rather prevent another financial crisis by reducing systemic risk). When
viewed in isolation, a single un-cleared transaction by a financial entity or
major swap participant does not create systemic risk; however, when viewed
in the aggregate, the failure to include such a transaction would undermine
the intent of the bill. Id.
135. See Bart Chilton, Comm'r, Commodities Futures Trading Comm'n,
Address to the National Supply Summit: House Money (Oct. 25, 2010),
available at http://www.cftc.gov/pressroom/speechestestimony/opachilton33.html (explaining that the CFTC will promulgate rules that will be carefully
tailored to ensure that end-users who are legitimate hedgers do not fall into
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The CFTC has drafted a series of proposed rules which
appear to satisfy both requirements.136
1. Defining the End-User

Under Dodd-Frank, a party qualifies for the end-user
exception if it is not a "financial entity" and it uses "swaps to
hedge or mitigate commercial risk."137 As such, the definitions of
financial entity and commercial risk will determine whether a
party qualifies for the end-user exception. The Act defines
financial entity by providing nine categories of swap users.1 38 The
categories of financial entity most relevant to end-users are "swap
dealer" and "major swap participant."
a.

Swap Dealer
A party is a "swap dealer," under the proposed rules, if the
party "(r)egularly enters into swaps with counterparties as an
ordinary course of business for its own account."139 However, an
exception is made for "a person that enters into swaps for such
person's own account, either individually or in a fiduciary capacity,
but not as a part of regular business." 4 0
Additionally, the proposed provides for a "de minimis
exception" for persons who satisfy three requirements.141 The first
requirement is that a person's annual aggregated gross notional
the categories of "swap dealer" or "major swap participant").
136. End-User Exception to Mandatory Clearing of Swaps, 75 Fed. Reg.
80747 (proposed Dec. 23, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. 39); Further
Definition of "Swap Dealer," "Security-Based Swap Dealer," "Major Swap
Participant," "Major Security-Based Swap Participant," and "Eligible Contract
Participant," 75 Fed. Reg. 244, 80174 (proposed Dec. 21, 2010) (to be codified
at 17 C.F.R. 1).
137. Wall Street Transparency and Accountability Act of 2010 § 723.
138. See Wall Street Transparency and Accountability Act of 2010 §§ 723,
763 (defining financial entity as a party who is a swap dealer, a security-based
swap dealer, a major swap participant, a major security-based swap
participant, a commodity pool, a private fund, an employee benefit plan, or a
person predominantly engaged in activities that are in the business of banking
or in activities that are financial in nature). However, the Act requires the
CFTC and SEC to consider whether to exempt small banks, savings
associations, farm credit systems institutions, and credit unions from the
definition of financial entity in this section. Id. Such a conclusion would
qualify them for the exception. Id.
139. "Major Security-Based Swap Participant," and "Eligible Contract
Participant," 75 Fed. Reg. 244, 80212:
In general. The term "swap dealer" means any person who: (i) holds
itself out as a dealer in swaps; (ii) makes a market in swaps; (iii)
regularly enters into swaps with counterparties as an ordinary course of
business for its own account; or (iv) engages in any activity causing it to
be commonly known in the trade as a dealer or market maker in swaps.
140. Id.
141. Id.
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amount of swap positions is no more than $100 million. 142 Second,
the person must not have entered into swaps with more than
fifteen nonswap dealer counterparties.143 Finally, the person must
not have entered into more than twenty swaps over the course of
the preceding twelve months. 144 If all three requirements are
satisfied then the person is exempt from the definition of swap
dealer.
As written, the definition of "swap dealer" with the exceptions
should be sufficiently narrow to exclude all end-users. However, it
is foreseeable that a question will arise as to whether an end-user
should fall under the swap-dealer exception for persons who enter
into swaps for their own accounts.
The resolution to such a question will be determined by the
interpretation of the phrase "regular business." If such a question
were to arise, then the courts should heed the guidance of the
Commission and determine that a person is in the regular
business of entering into swaps if it is the function of the swap
transaction to "accommodate demand for swaps from other parties
and enter into swaps in response to interest expressed by other
parties."145 End-users by nature engage in swap transactions to
hedge their own commercial risks rather than to accommodate an
interest expressed by another party. Therefore, by adopting such a
definition of regular business, the courts will ensure that
legitimate end-users will not fall under the definition of swap
dealer.
b. Major Swap Participant
The second category of "financial entity" that has the
potential to be defined in a manner that would cause end-users to
fall within its scope is "major swap participant." In general, the
definition as proposed by the Commission is sufficiently broad to
ensure that all end-users fall within the definition while narrow
enough to exclude speculators.14 6
To qualify as a major swap participant a person must satisfy
a two-prong test. 147 The first prong is that the person must not be
a swap dealer. The second prong can be satisfied by meeting one of
three tests.
142. See id. at 80180 (stating that if the counterparty is considered a special
entity for a category of swaps than the limit is $25 million rather than the
standard $100 million). Additionally, if the stated notional amount is
leveraged or enhanced, then the $100 million exception is to be based upon the
effective notional amount rather than the stated notional amount. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 80177.
146. See generally id. at 80212-80213 (defining the relevant components of
the major swap participant classification).
147. Id. at 80212.
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The first test is that a person maintains a substantial position
in swaps excluding positions held for hedging or mitigating
commercial risk. 148 The proposed rules have defined substantial
position in a manner such that its reasonableness is contingent
upon the definition of hedging or mitigating commercial risk.14 9 As
such, the crux of the test is the definition of hedging or mitigating
commercial risk.
The Commission has proposed a definition of hedging or
mitigating commercial risk that provides for a wide range of
transactions that are considered for the purpose of hedging or
mitigating.1 50 At the same time, the definition explicitly excludes
swap positions that are for the purpose of speculation, trading,
and investigating.15 1 The proposed rule also excludes positions
that are used for hedging swaps.152 As a result, the definition of
hedging or mitigating commercial risk is broad enough that it will
cover the vast majority of end-user swap transactions, and at the
same time is narrow enough to exclude all speculative positions.
Because the vast majority of end-users will engage in transactions
that fall under the definition of hedging or mitigating commercial
risk, end-users should not have a problem keeping their swap
positions below the "substantial position" threshold.
In proposing the second test, the Commission did not lose
sight of the ultimate goal of Dodd-Frank, which is to limit systemic
risk.153 The second test includes all persons "[w]hose outstanding
swaps create substantial counterparty exposure that could have
serious adverse effects on the financial stability of the United
States banking system or financial markets." 54 The Commission
148. Id.
149. See id. at 80213:
For purposes of Section la(33) of the Commodity Exchange Act and
§ 1.3(qqq), the term substantial position means swap positions, other
than positions that are excluded from consideration, that equal or
exceed any of the following thresholds in the specified major category of
swaps:(i) For rate swaps: (A) $3 billion in daily average aggregate
uncollateralized outward exposure; or (B) $6 billion in: (1) Daily average
aggregate uncollateralized outward exposure plus (2) Daily average
aggregate potential outward exposure. (ii) For credit swaps: (A) $1
billion in daily average aggregate uncollateralized outward exposure; or
(B) $2 billion in: (1) Daily average aggregate uncollateralized outward
exposure plus (2) Daily average aggregate potential outward exposure.
Because substantial position is determined after swaps that are used for
hedging or mitigating commercial risk, the position amount threshold is
irrelevant in the absence of a definition of hedging or mitigating commercial
risk. Id.
150. See id. at 80214-15 (setting forth the criteria for hedging or mitigating
commercial risk).
151. Id. at 80215.
152. Id.
153. Gensler, supra note 129.
154. Further Definition of "Swap Dealer," 75 Fed. Reg. 244, 80212.
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has proposed several threshold amounts to satisfy the test.15 5
Notably, the definition does not provide for an offset for hedged
transactions. 15 6 However, this should not be an issue for end-users
because the proposed thresholds are of sufficient size that endusers should be able to easily maintain swap positions that are
less than the threshold amount.
Finally, the third test ensures that persons who are highly
leveraged relative to the amount of capital they hold and maintain
a substantial position in swaps are considered major swap
participants.15 7 Like the second test, the third test does not
provide an offset for swaps that are used for hedging. Because the
conduct that would cause a person to fall within the scope of the
third test is similar to the conduct of the persons who caused the
financial crisis, the Commission has correctly denied such persons,
traditional end-user or not, the option of exempting their trades
from exchange trading.
Therefore, because the proposed definitions of "swap dealer"
and "major swap participant" are wide enough to cover speculators
but narrow enough to avoid encompassing end-users, the
Commission's proposed definition of "financial entity" is of a
proper scope.
2. Hedge or Mitigate Commercial Risk
While, the proposed scope of the term "financial entity" is
appropriate, the scope of end-user is also contingent upon the
definition of "hedge or mitigate commercial risk." Fortunately, the
Commission has decided to propose a definition of "hedge or
mitigate commercial risk" that is nearly identical to the definition
used in the definition of "major swap participant." 15 8 As a result,
the definition of "hedge or mitigate commercial risk" for the
purposes of determining whether a person is a major swap
participant is of a sufficient scope for the purposes of determining
whether a person is an end-user.

155. Id. at 80215:
(uuu) Substantial counterparty exposure. (1) In general. For purposes of
Section la(33) of the Act and § 1.3(qqq), the phrase substantial
counterparty exposure that could have serious adverse effects on the
financial stability of the United States banking system or financial
markets means a swap position that satisfies either of the following
thresholds: (i) $5 billion in daily average aggregate uncollateralized
outward exposure; or (ii) $8 billion in: (A) Daily average aggregate
uncollateralized outward exposure plus (B) Daily average aggregate
potential outward exposure.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 80212.
158. See id. at 80753 (discussing the parallel approach to rule making).
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B. Treatment of FinancialEntity Counterparties
While the Commission has proposed a definition of end-user
that is of a proper scope, an additional loophole for financial
entities continues to exist.
Financial entities who are counterparties to swap
transactions with qualified end-users should not fall under the
end-user exception.159 The exception provides parties to a swap
contract with the option of exempting the end-users' swaps from
the exchange trading and clearance requirements.160 As such, the
decision whether to require exchange trading and clearance
remains with the parties. However, such freedom to contract only
works when the parties operate on a relatively level playing field.
The experience of end-users in the OTC markets has shown that
end-users do not have the negotiating power to demand that
financial entities post sufficient margin to protect end-users from
the risk of default by the financial entity.16 1 Because end-users are
not in a position to require financial entities to post margin that
accurately reflects counterparty risk, it should be left to the
clearing houses and the appropriate Commission to fill this void. 162
Because not all OTC swap transactions pose the same degree
of risk to the end-user, 163 any margin requirement should be of a
minimally adequate level to address the risks created. 164 At the
same time, it is not the intent of the Act to expose end-users to the

159. See Letter from the Coalition of Derivatives End-Users, supra note 64
(presenting the position of supporters of a broad definition that there should
be a blanket exception for financial entity counterparties to swap transactions
with exempt end-users).
160. See Wall Street Transparency and Accountability Act of 2010 § 712, 15
U.S.C. § 8302 (explaining that "[tihe application of the clearing exception ...
is solely at the discretion of the counterparty to the swap that meets the
conditions .... ).
161. See Turbeville, supra note 118 (stating that end-users do not have
adequate negotiating power to require financial swap counterparties to post
sufficient margin to protect the end-users in the case of default). Therefore,
when financial entities do not post margin, end-users are exposed to the risk
that in the event of default the financial entity will not be able to hold up its
end of the bargain. Id. As a result, the end-user will be fully exposed to the
risk they were seeking to hedge against. Id. In the past, it was thought that
financial entities were not capable of default given their position in the
marketplace, however, the collapse of Lehman Brothers proved that
presumption wrong. Id.
162. See Letter from Christopher Dodd, supra note 108 (stating that, while
regulators may not impose margin requirements on end-users, margin
requirements placed on swap counterparties should reflect the counterparty
risk).
163. See id. (stating that all risks are not the same and therefore margin and
collateral requirements should reflect the specific risk posed by the
transaction).
164. Id.
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costs of exchange trading and clearance.16 5 Therefore, the margin
requirements placed upon financial entities must not be so
financially onerous that they will be left with no option but to
insist that margin be posted by end-users. 166
Advocates of a broad exception contend financial entities will
react to the imposition of any margin requirement by requiring
end-users to post margin.16 7 Assuming such a contention is correct,
all financial entities, including those who are counterparties to
swap transactions with end-users, should nonetheless be subjected
to the clearing requirements of the Act. The primary intent of the
Act is to reduce risks and prevent the occurrence of another
financial crisis.168 As such, shielding end-users from an increase in
hedging costs is only a secondary effect of the Act. 169 While there
are many end-users, there are only a few swap dealers.
Consequently, the systemic risk posed by end-user-financial-entity
swap transactions is only revealed when the transactions are
aggregated. 170 As a result, financial entity counterparties to swap
transactions with end-users must be required to post minimally

165. See id. (stating that it is not the intent of the Act to expose end-users to
the burdensome costs associated with clearance, which includes the positing of
margin).
166. See id. (discussing the proper balance between the level of risk
presented by the uncleared transaction and the purpose of the end-user
exception, which was to prevent end-users from being subjected to the costs of
posting margin).
167. See Letter from Dolan, supra note 110 (stating that any imposition of
margin on financial entity swap counterparties will result in margin being
placed on end-users).
168. See Gensler, supra note 134 (stating that the primary purpose of the
Act is to reduce risk).
169. See John Carney, Will the CFTC Kill the End-User Exception?, CNBC
(Oct. 4, 2010, 5:19 PM), http://www.cnbc.comlid/39506763/WillTheCFTC
KillTheEndUserException (stating the final draft does not contain an
explicit end-user exception). See generally Wall Street Transparency and
Accountability Act of 2010 (showing the exception is created through the
piecing together of several different provisions). As such, it would be
inappropriate for an exception that is not explicitly created to trump the
primary intent of the Act. Id.
170. See Gensler, supra note 134 (discussing that, when aggregated, the
swap transactions of financial entities pose a risk to the financial system). In
this case, while the transaction remains OTC, the same principal applies. Id.
The posting of margin by financial entities reduces risk. Id. See also
WEISTROFFER, supra note 14, at 14 (discussing the small number of financial
entities involved in the swap market). As such, only a small number of
financial entities are counterparties to OTC end-user swap transactions. Id.
Therefore, when viewed in the aggregate, a pattern emerges where a small
group of financial entities repeatedly enter into OTC swap transactions with
qualified end-users. Id. As a result, in the absence of a margin requirement,
end-users are exposed to a great deal of risk in the event of default by one of
the financial entities. Id.
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adequate margin.17 '
V.

CONCLUSION

After operating in the shadows for years, Dodd-Frank has
brought much needed transparency to the OTC derivatives
market. The end-user exception seeks to strike a balance between
providing maximum market transparency while minimizing the
impact on hedging costs for end-users. Maintaining this delicate
balance will be the key to the future success of the end-user
exception.

171. See James Hamilton, Senators Dodd and Lincoln Clarify the End User
Exemption in the Derivatives Title of Dodd-Frank, WOLTERS KLUWER FIN.
REFORM
NEWS
CTR.
(July
2,
2010,
7:14
AM),
http://fin
ancialreform.wolterskluwerlb.com/2010/07/senators-dodd-and-lincoln-clarifythe-end-user-exemption-in-the-derivatives-title-of-dodd-frank.html:
In cases where a Swap Dealer enters into an uncleared swap with an
end-user, margin on the dealer side of the transaction should reflect the
counterparty risk of the transaction. Congress strongly encourages
regulators to establish margin requirements for such swaps . . . in a

manner that is consistent with the Congressional intent to protect endusers from burdensome costs.
Therefore, it is consistent with the intent of Congress to require minimally
adequate margin, which is customized based upon the risk created, even if it
will result in the imposition of a margin requirement on end-users. Id.

